Sprint 28 Engineering Log

Program Context

• Phase: Phase 7
• Sprint: Sprint 28
• Status: Completed
• Primary Architecture Layers: C2 Trust Boundary, Zero-Trust Enforcement

Architectural Intent

Establish hardened zero-trust boundary controls for C2 adapters before live session expansion.

Implementation Detail

Implemented:

• C2 dispatch bundle bound cryptographically to unified execution fingerprint.
• Mandatory JWS verification gate at adapter boundary.
• Policy decision hash validation gate at adapter boundary.
• Hardened execution boundary isolation (adapter allowlist + command token blocking).
• Malicious adapter behavior simulation and detection path.

Security and Control Posture

• Dispatch is denied on fingerprint mismatch, invalid signature, or policy hash mismatch.
• Adapters execute only inside explicit hardened boundary registry.
• Suspicious payload command tokens are blocked before adapter invocation.

QA and Validation Evidence

• Unit tests cover fingerprint binding, JWS boundary verification, policy hash mismatch rejection, boundary isolation, and malicious behavior simulation.
• Sprint QA suite verifies roadmap checkbox completion and required boundary contract symbols.

Risk Register

• Risk: blocked token heuristics may require tuning for certain legitimate command syntaxes.
• Mitigation: refine boundary command parser with adapter-specific safe grammars in Sprint 29.

Forward Linkage

Sprint 29 introduces hardened Sliver implementation and Mythic scaffold over this boundary.