Sprint 19 Engineering Log

Program Context

Harden control-plane integrity gates so startup and cryptographic trust anchors are verifiable and tamper-evident.

Completed Sprint 19 controls:

Added JWS-based signed startup configuration enforcement (pkg.orchestrator.control_plane_integrity).
Enforced startup rejection for unsigned/invalid signatures.
Added OPA policy hash pinning and explicit mismatch denial handling.
Added runtime binary SHA-256 baseline validation against signed envelope.
Added append-only immutable configuration version history with hash chaining.
Added dedicated tamper-evident integrity audit channel (spectrastrike.audit.integrity).
Added automated Vault transit signing-key rotation workflow.
Added hardened Vault unseal share validation policy (threshold, uniqueness, share quality).
Added unit and QA coverage for all above controls.

Startup trust now requires signed config + pinned policy + binary baseline checks before success path.
Integrity-critical events are separately hash chained for tamper-evident auditability.
Vault lifecycle controls (rotation/unseal) are now codified as explicit workflows.

Commands:

PYTHONPATH=src .venv/bin/pytest -q tests/unit/test_control_plane_integrity.py
PYTHONPATH=src .venv/bin/pytest -q tests/unit/test_vault_hardening.py
PYTHONPATH=src .venv/bin/pytest -q tests/unit/test_orchestrator_signing.py
PYTHONPATH=src .venv/bin/pytest -q tests/unit/test_logging_framework.py
PYTHONPATH=src .venv/bin/pytest -q tests/qa/test_sprint19_control_integrity_qa.py

Residual risk:

Runtime baseline currently verifies local binary hash and depends on secured deployment pipeline for golden hash provenance.
Vault unseal workflow validates policy constraints but does not perform live Vault unseal operations in unit scope.

Sprint 20 advances high-assurance AAA controls (hardware-backed MFA, dual-control approvals, and break-glass hardening).